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THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGANT IN CALIFORNIA:
OBSERVATIONS ON TAXPAYERS' ACTIONS
by Ronald K. L. Collins*
&
Robert M. Myers**
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has occurred a proliferation of public interest
lawsuits.1 Under the rubric of taxpayers' suits, private attorney general
actions, or public interest litigation,2 the judicial process has been
frequently resorted to in order to vindicate important commonly shared
rights in such areas as civil liberties and civil rights, environmental
conservation, administrative regulation, consumer protection, tax assess-
ments, and municipal affairs. Together with state initiatives, referen-
dums, recall measures, public hearings, and public record acts, public
interest lawsuits serve to ensure more meaningful and democratic partic-
ipation in the governmental decision-making process. At the same time
they afford the public an opportunity to correct governmental abuses
that might otherwise go unchecked. It is more than a trite saying to
declare that given the modern course of events these kinds of actions are
one of the more effective forms of therapeutic devices genuinely avail-
able to public-minded citizens wishing to cure those ills which plague
the body politic.
* B.A. (University of California); J.D. (Loyola University of Los Angeles).
** B.A. (California State University); J.D. (Loyola University of Los Angeles); Staff
Attorney, Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance and thoughtful support of Steven
H. Shiffrin, Allan E. Wilion and Roger L. Hostin.
1. Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 301 &
n.1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Nussbaum].
2. Public interest litigation has been described as that kind of lawsuit which "is
brought by private plaintiffs in the hope of achieving broader results by litigating issues
of . . . current importance which when resolved will affect substantial numbers of
people." Id. at 305. For the definitional characteristics of the aforementioned
description, see id. at 304-05; Cahn & Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?-
The Public Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005 (1970); Halpern & Cun-
ningham, Reflections on the New Public Interest Law: Theory and Practice at the
Center for Law and Social Policy, 59 GEo. L.J. 1095 (1971); Rabin, Lawyers for Social
Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REv. 207 (1976). Since the
above characteristics are common to private attorney general, taxpayers', and public in-
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The restrictive posture of federal common law doctrines has had a
substantial chilling effect on the filing of taxpayers' lawsuits. As will be
discussed, the rules governing "standing" and the recovery of attorneys'
fees render the federal forum all but hostile to public interest litigants.
Given that sentiment, this article will examine the effective scope of such
suits at the state level as a viable alternative to taxpayer litigants. In
conjunction with that aim, the article's primary focus will be on those
problematic areas likely to impede the successful effectuation of public
interest lawsuits.
II. TAXPAYER STANDING AND RELATED MATTERS
Archimedes is reported to have once said: "Give me a place to stand
. . .and I can move the earth."3  Indeed, there is an element of legal
truth that can be extrapolated from the prophetic words of this ancient
Greek mathematician. Certainly, in the area of taxpayers' suits, 4 cases
such as Frothingham v. Mellon5 and United States v. Richardson,
among others, 7 evidence the legal importance of having sufficient
grounds for standing to sue. Traditional article III justiciability limita-
tions8 requiring a plaintiff to have a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy have regularly been applied by the Supreme Court to bar
federal taxpayers' suits.9 Even under the more liberal Flast v. Cohen0
terest suits, the terms, although they may be technically distinguishable, will, for the
purposes of this article, be used interchangeably unless otherwise specifically designated.
3. 11 GREAT BooKs OF THE WESTERN WORLD 399 (R.M. Hutchins ed. 1952).
4. A description of taxpayers' suits can be found in 18 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF
MUMCn'AL CORPORATIONS §§ 52.02-.03a (3d ed. 1949) [hereinafter cited as McQUILLIN];
see text accompanying notes 25 & 28 infra. For a broad analysis of taxpayers' suits, see
McQU=LUN, supra, §§ 52.01-.52; Comment, Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Sum-
mary, 69 YALE L.J. 895 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Taxpayers' Suits]. A de-
finitive treatment of the federal taxpayer question can be found in Berger, Standing to
Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969);
Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HAV. L. REV. 1265
(1961); Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968); Note, Citizen Organizations
Intervening in Federal Administrative Proceedings: The Lingering Issue of Standing, 51
B.U.L. REv. 403 (1971); Note, Taxpayer Standing to Litigate, 61 GEo. L.J. 747 (1973).
5. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
6. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
7. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974);
Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
8. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968).
9. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192-94 (1974) (Powell, I.,
concurring); cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-97 (1968).
10. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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"two-tier nexus test,"'1 taxpayers' access to the federal courthouse has
continued to be quite limited. 2 The net result is that the slow, cumber-
some, and sometimes unresponsive electoral process remains the only
realistic federal forum available to taxpayers to check legislative and
executive abuses.
13
Despite the continued reluctance of federal courts to permit taxpayers
to bring suits in the public interest, "[s]uch challenges by state taxpay-
ers are, however, now allowed in some three-fourths of the states."'14
And while state taxpayers' suits against state governmental actions are
accorded less judicial favor than those maintained against municipal
governmental actions,' 5 it is evident that the philosophy of these several
11. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, outlined the test as follows:
The nexus demanded of federal taxpayers has two aspects to it. First, the tax-
payer must establish a logical link between that status and the type of legislative
enactment attacked. Thus, a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the uncon-
stitutionality only of exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spend-
ing clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution .... Secondly, the taxpayer must
establish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional
infringement alleged. Under this requirement, the taxpayer must show that the
challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the
exercise of the congressional taxing arid spending power and not simply that the
enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8.
Id. at 102-03. For a worthwhile analysis of the Flast holding, see K. DAvis,
ADMNISTRATri LAW TREASE §§ 22.09-.09-7 (Supp. 1970); Note, Taxpayer Standing
to Litigate, 61 GEo. L.I. 747, 750-65 (1973).
12. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 235-38
(1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 197-202
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REv. 41,
236-43 (1974).
13. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974); cf. Schlesinger V.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 233-34 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). Moreover,
[tihe need for taxpayers' suits arises from the absence of alternative means of
correcting illegal practices of government officials which would otherwise be irrep-
arable. One alternative to taxpayers' suits is, of course, the elective process itself,
but the electorate may ignore corruption, illegality, or unconstitutionality which
occurred early in the term or which is relatively less eyecatching than the overall
record of those in power; elections present package alternatives, often only two in
number, and the voters are disabled from expressing their views on each govern-
mental act.
Taxpayers' Suits, supra note 4, at 910 (footnote omitted). Ironically enough, several
years ago the Supreme Court noted that "under the conditions of modern government,
litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue ... to petition for redress of
grievances." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963). See Simpson, Fifty Years
of American Equity, 50 HARV. L REV. 171, 231 (1936).
14. B. ScHWARTZ, ADMIISTRAIvE LAw 461 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ScHwARTz].
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 108-09 nn.2-4 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring); 3 K.
DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.09, at 245-46 (1958); 3 K. DAVIS,
ADmINISTRATVE LAW TREATISE § 22.10, at 759-62 (Supp. 1970); Taxpayers' Suits, supra
note 4, at 895-96 & n.7.
15. See ScawARrz, supra note 14, at 461.
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states is "based upon [a] rejection of the Frothingham reasoning."'
This liberal attitude of the states hinges on three fundamental proposi-
tions. First, "the nominal nature of the individual taxpayer's interest is
held not to rule out his standing. '17  Second, the state courts reject the
notion that any possible flooding of the court dockets constitutes suffi-
cient cause to ban taxpayers' actions.1 ' Third, the legislatures of the
various states have seen fit to encourage the free challenge of illegal
governmental action. As Professor Schwartz aptly points out:
To the state judges, of greater importance has been the need to ensure
that invalid public action will not be rendered immune from attack.
In the state view, the taxpayer, both as such and as a member of a
society grounded upon the rule of law, is intimately concerned with the
validity of action taken by the government which his tax dollars sup-
port.1
9
The combined effect of these three tenets of the states' general scheme
has been to place another sword for checking governmental abuse in the
otherwise meager arsenal of the citizen taxpayer.20 By contrast to the
federal forum, there is a plenitude of "standing" room in the state
courthouses for taxpayers.
A. Policy Basis For Taxpayers' Actions In California
As far back as 1858 the California Supreme Court established the
right of a citizen taxpayer to challenge the validity of local government
spending practices. 2 By 1909, the state legislature had codified the
right of such plaintiffs.22 Today that provision, section 526a of the
Code of Civil Procedure, provides in part:
16. Id.
17. Id. (footnote omitted). See Wirin v. Parker, 48 Cal. 2d 890, 894, 313 P.2d 844,
846 (1957); Wirin v. Horrall, 85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 504-06, 193 P.2d 470, 474-75
(1948).
18. See ScnwA rz, supra note 14, at 462. In this respect Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis notes:
If any special evils flow from the extreme liberality of these state courts on the
problem of standing, the evils are not apparent in the reported opinions. The courts
are not flooded by cases brought by officious intermeddlers, and no sign appears
that the adversary system has been either destroyed or impaired.
3 K. DAvis, ADMnINismATwE LAw TREATISE § 22.10, at 254 (1958) (footnote omitted).
See Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. Rav. 450, 470-71 (1970).
19. ScHi Tz, supra note 14, at 462 (footnote omitted).
20. One commentator has observed:
Such litigation allows the courts, within the framework of traditional notions of
"standing," to add to the controls over public officials inherent in the elective
process the judicial scrutiny of the statutory and constitutional validity of their acts.
Taxpayers' Suits, supra note 4, at 904.
21. Foster v. Coleman, 10 Cal. 278, 281 (1858); accord, Winn v. Shaw, 87 Cal. 631,
637, 25 P. 968, 969 (1891).
22. Law of March 20, 1909, ch. 348, § 1, [1909] Cal. Stat. 578.
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An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal
expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other
property of a county, town, city or city and county of the state, may be
maintained against any officer thereof, or any agent, or other person,
acting in its behalf, either by a citizen resident therein, or by a corpora-
tion, who is assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year before
-the commencement of the action, has paid, a tax therein.2-
Section 526a reflects the "very liberal" attitude of California courts in
permitting taxpayers to bring suits on behalf of the public in order to
prevent illegal governmental conduct.2" More importantly, as a unani-
mous court in Blair v. Pitchess25 declared:
The primary purpose of this statute ...is to "enable a large
body of the citizenry to challenge governmental action which would
otherwise go unchallenged in the courts because of the standing require-
ment."2 6
The state line of cases holds that "the principles of justiciability in
taxpayers' suits under section 526a differ fundamentally from the
restrictive federal doctrine .... That difference applies to taxpayers'
suits grounded in common law doctrines2 s as well as to those arising
under section 526a. The distinction between common law and statu-
tory causes of action is important in that one form of action may offer a
broader remedial basis than another. When a court decides to invoke a
more liberal interpretation of the applicable taxpayer statutes, such a
court may well be availing itself of its independent powers under the
23. The remainder of section 526a states:
This section does not affect any right of action in favor of a county, city, town, or
city and county, or any public officer; provided, that no injunction shall be granted
restraining the offering for sale, sale, or issuance of any municipal bonds for public
improvements or public utilities.
An action brought pursuant to this section to enjoin a public improvement project
shall take special precedence over all civil matters on the calendar of the court ex-
cept those matters to which equal precedence on the calendar is granted by law.
CAL. CODE CIv. PRO. § 526a (West Supp. 1976). See Note, California Taxpayers'
Suits: Suing State Officers Under Section 526a of the Code of Civil Procedure, 28
lAsrms L.J. 477 (1977).
24. See Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 268, 486 P.2d 1242, 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42,
49 (1971); Crowev. Boyle, 184 Cal. 117, 152, 193 P. 111, 125 (1920).
25. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242,96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
26. Id. at 267-68, 486 P.2d at 1248-49, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 48-49, quoting Taxpayers'
Suits, supra, note 4, at 904. Recently the California Supreme Court has reaffirmed that
position in White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 763-65, 533 P.2d 222, 225-27, 120 Cal. Rptr.
94, 97-99 (1975).
27. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 764, 533 P.2d 222, 227, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 99
(1975).
28. See Harman v. City & County of San Francisco, 7 Cal. 3d 150, 159-161, 496 P.2d
1248, 1254-55, 101 Cal. Rptr. 880, 886-87 (1972); cases cited note 21 supra.
1977]
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precedents established at common law. In part, the practice can be
attributed to -the conviction, long subscribed to in California, that public
interest litigation ought to be encouraged. For over a century the state
attitude has always been to encourage the private attorney general
"[b]ecause [when] the motive of a plaintiff-taxpayer is viewed as
irrelevant, taxpayers' suits afford a means of mobilizing the self-interest
of individuals within the body politic to challenge legislative programs,
prevent illegality, and avoid corruption."2 9
B. Who Qualifies As A Taxpayer Plaintiff?
Section 526a expressly confers standing upon four different classes of
litigants: (1) upon a citizen resident who is "assessed" a tax; (2) upon
a corporation which is "assessed" a tax; (3) upon a citizen resident who
"has paid a tax;" or (4) upon a corporation which "has paid a tax."
Separate and apart from any corporate status, a literal interpretation of
section 526a would indicate that a taxpayer plaintiff must be a citizen
resident in order to establish standing. However, the California
Supreme Court in Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach0 held that a lit-
eral interpretation of the code is not only improper but also violates
equal protection guarantees:
We would consider these arguments [requiring local residence]
eminently persuasive if it were not for the fact that [such a] reading of
section 526a ... violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. No reason has been presented to us, or conceived by us,
which would render less than arbitrary and capricious a distinction
whioh would give a nonresident corporate taxpayer the right to main-
tain a suit such as here contemplated, but would deny the same right
to a nonresident taxpayer who is a natural person.31
Significantly, the Irwin court extended the scope of section 526a to
encompass nonresident taxpayers even though the section expressly
precluded such an interpretation. Nevertheless, one fortuitous factual
aspect of the Irwin case might be interpreted as a limitation on the
court's holding. While the plaintiff in Irwin was not a resident tax-
payer, she was a property owner and had paid taxes levied against her
29. Taxpayers' Suits, supra note 4, at 904 (emphasis added and footnote omitted), See
Mock v. City of Santa Rosa, 126 Cal. 330, 58 P. 826 (1899); McQumLIN, supra note 4,
at 21-22. I keeping with this general policy, the state has enacted the Public Records
Act. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 6250-61 (West Supp. 1976).
30. 65 Cal. 2d 13, 415 P.2d 769, 51 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966).
31. Id. at 19, 415 P.2d at 772-73, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 884-85 (emphasis added and
omitted).
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property by the city." That factor could thus alter Irwin's holding to a
sub silentio rule requiring property ownership whenever the taxpayer
plaintiff is not a citizen resident. While the Irwin court did not utter
a single word which would justify the notion that property taxpayers
are to be given special treatment, the plaintiff's status in that case re-
mains potentially significant.
However, such a property ownership requirement is at odds with the
logic of Irwin. The court's holding in Irwin turns on the single princi-
ple that nonresident individuals should be treated no differently than
nonresident corporations. Certainly, the Irwin holding does not re-
strict standing to those natural persons who are nonresident property
owners. The statute on its face requires no such ownership status. To
adopt the argument that an individual must be a real property owner
within a given city or county, while a nonresident corporation need not
be, would perpetuate the same equal protection violation invalidated
in Irwin. Moreover, it would prove equally discriminatory as against
nonresident lessees who may not own property. So understood, any
interpretation which would condition section 526a standing upon an
arbitrary property ownership requirement would clash with the very
rationale applied in Irwin. 3
Under the terms of section 526a, corporate plaintiffs, whether domes-
tic or foreign, need not be residents so long as they have been "assessed"
a tax or have in fact paid a tax to the particular county, town, or city
"within one year before the commencement of the action." These same
conditions apply equally to resident individuals. An assessed tax neces-
sarily implies a tax assessment against local property. Plaintiffs, either
corporate or citizen, asserting standing on such grounds would most
likely have to be property owners in the general locale of the government
whose conduct is being challenged. Irwin expands section 526a by
abolishing the requirement that a property owner also be a resident.
Additionally, the code, as modified by Irwin, grants automatic stand-
ing to all corporate or individual plaintiffs who have paid a tax. Since
the statute does not specify the kind of tax here required, the statutory
32. Id. at 18-19, 415 P.2d at 772-73, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 884-85. See also Gamble v.
City of San Diego, 79 F. 487 (9th Cir. 1897); Taxpayers' Suits, supra note 4, at 910.
33. A nonresident corporation which paid a sales tax within a given city,
town, or county would, by the express terms of the statute, have a right to sue since it
has "paid a tax therein." Moreover, a nonresident, nonproperty owner plaintiff may
just as easily form a close corporation which would, after paying a sales tax, have
standing to sue under the statute. Nothing in California law, however, requires an
earnest taxpayer litigant to embark on such a charade.
1977]
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language should be construed to include the payment of all forms of
taxes, such as license, gasoline, cigarette, sales, utility, and various
business or city income taxes.3 4  Moreover, section 526a requires only
that a tax be paid to the treasury of a city, county or town therein
generally, thereby precluding any necessity for tracing the tax paid to
the action on which the complaint is based.
At first blush, it may seem ludicrous to permit nonresidents to
challenge city or county actions merely because they have paid some
nominal tax. But when one recalls the "primary purpose!' of state taxpay-
ers' suits, 5 it is readily apparent that such criticism is unfounded. The
rule in California has always been that "[i]t is immaterial that the
amount of the illegal expenditures is small or that the illegal procedures
actually permit a saving of tax funds. 36 The essential focus is on the
illegal or wasteful nature of the governmental act. It does not matter
that the plaintiff has suffered little or no injury as a taxpayer or that the
taxpayer is not a resident or local property owner. The only requisite is
that the complaining party has paid a tax and on that basis seeks to
enjoin certain illegal, wasteful or injurious acts incompatible with the
public interest of the citizenry affected. Consequently, the taxpayer's
primary interest inheres in the wrongful act committed against the
public per se. The various state court holdings which allow for a very
liberal application of the rules in taxpayers' suits3 7 even where the
plaintiff is a nonresident," or where the amount of the tax paid is de
minimis,m or where there is no showing of special damages to the tax-
payer 0 all lend support to the private attorney general concept of tax-
payers' actions. .1
34. In City of Columbus ex reL Willits v. Cremean, 273 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1971), the
court held that the payment of a city income tax was sufficient to grant the plaintiff
standing even though he was a nonresident of the city whose sewer charges he was
challenging. Id. at 327.
35. See text accompanying notes 26 & 29 supra.
36. Wirin v. Parker, 48 Cal. 2d 890, 894, 313 P.2d 844, 846 (1957). See County of
Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. App. 2d 670, 678, 62 Cal. Rptr. 435, 441
(1967); ScnwAmz, supra note 14, at 461; Taxpayers' Suits, supra note 4, at 905.
37. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
38. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
39. See note 36 supra and accompanying text; text accompanying note 67 infra.
40. See text accompanying note 70 infra.
41. With respect to the residency or property ownership questions, it cannot be
accurately maintained that only resident or property owner plaintiffs have a real interest
in the conduct of any given community's actions or that they are the only ones affected.
This is borne out by the very character of modern day city life. In a mobile society like
our own, people do not isolate the conduct of their lives to a single locale. It is not
uncommon to work in one city, live in another, and seek entertainment in a third city,
[Vol. 10
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C. Who Can Be Named As A Defendant?
The applicable provision of section 526a provides that an action "may
be maintained against any officer thereof, or any agent, or other person,
acting in [a county, town, or city's] behalf."42  On its face, the statute
applies only to specific agents or officers of the governmental entity
rather than to the entity itself. However, nonrestrictive interpretations
by the courts of statutory and common law requirements for taxpayers'
suits have permitted plaintiffs to maintain actions against such govern-
mental entities as counties,43 cities,44 and municipal agencies.45 Like-
wise, it may also be proper to join public bondholders or contractors as
defendants in a taxpayer's action.4 6
The express language of the statute also would appear to preclude its
application to state officials who do not fall within the class of enunci-
ated defendants. However, the California appellate courts, in exercis-
ing their common law prerogative, have recognized a taxpayer's cause
of action against state officials seemingly independent of section 526a's
provisions.47 Similarly, the court in Duskin v. San Francisco Redevel-
opment Agency4" held that a taxpayer's suit could be maintained
while at the same time commuting through a number of other intermediate cities or
counties. Consequently, it is not necessarily accurate to picture the acts of one city or
county as affecting only its residents or property owners. Consider what would happen
if a metropolitan hub like Hollywood, California enacted an ordinance banning all
cinema theatres or all bookstores. Would only the residents or property owners of
Hollywood be harmed? See generally Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 492
P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972); Hutchinson, Standing to Sue in Public Interest
Litigation, 7 LINCOLN L. REv. 40 (1971); Comment, Land-Use Control, Externalities,
and the Municipal Affairs Doctrine: A Border Conflict, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 432
(1975).
42. CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 526a (West Supp. 1976).
43. Harman v. City & County of San Francisco, 7 Cal. 3d 150, 496 P.2d 1248, 101
Cal. Rptr. 880 (1972); Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P.2d 1
(1956); Advance Medical Diagnostic Laboratories v. County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal.
App. 3d 263, 129 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1976).
44. Harman v. City & County of San Francisco, 7 Cal. 3d 150, 496 P.2d 1248, 101
Cal. Rptr. 880 (1972); Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach, 65 Cal. 2d 13, 415 P.2d 769,
51 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966); Carl v. City of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. App. 3d 265, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 365 (1976).
45. Card v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 61 Cal. App. 3d 570, 131 Cal. Rptr.
153 (1976); see Smith v. Mount Diablo Unified School Dist., 56 Cal. App. 3d 412, 128
Cal. Rptr. 572 (1976).
46. McQUILu., supra note 4, at 87. See Smith v. Mount Diablo Unified School
Dist., 56 Cal. App. 3d 412, 128 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1976).
47. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 268, 486 P.2d 1242, 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 49
(1971); California State Employees' Ass'n v. Williams, 7 Cal. App. 3d 390, 395, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 305, 308 (1970); Ahlgren v. Carr, 209 Cal. App. 2d 248, 252-54, 25 Cal. Rptr.
887, 890-91 (1962). See Note, California Taxpayers' Suits: Suing State Officers Under
Section 526a of the Code of Civil Procedure, 28 HASTNGs L.J. 477 (1977).
48. 31 Cal. App. 3d 769, 107 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1973).
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against a state agency where the complaint was not specifically limited
to a section 526a cause of action.49 These cases illustrate the signifi-
cance of an independent common law doctrine which the courts will
sometimes utilize in addition to or instead of section 526a grounds, in
order to encourage the successful litigation of taxpayers' suits.
Somewhat recently the California Court of Appeal in Gould v. People
ex rel. Busch5" ruled that the judiciary is immune from the reach of
taxpayers' suits. In an action to enjoin state judges, district and city
attorneys, and police officials from prosecuting certain obscenity cases,
the Gould court first stated:
[To hold section 526a applicable to the judges named as defendants in
the instant case would undercut the concept of judicial immunity and
wash away the very foundation of an independent judiciary.' 1
The plaintiffs in Gould were disputing the court's judicial authority.
Therefore it is reasonable to assume that the rule of Gould applies only
to the judiciary acting in its adjudicative rather than in its administrative
capacity. This conclusion is supported by the authorities upon which
the Gould court relied.2 Those authorities are grounded in the notion
that judges "exercising judicial functions"53 or performing their "'judi-
cial acts' "5 should be immune from civil actions. That was the
situation in Gould. But what if a presiding judge of a local superior or
municipal court decided to expend funds appropriated to the judiciary
for illegal or wasteful administrative purposes such as the purchase of
religious decor for the courthouse? Or what if this judge permitted
some religious organization to use the court premises on weekends for
sectarian purposes? Or if the premises were used for nonpublic purpos-
es? Or if public funds were illegally or wastefully deposited in private
coffers? The list is endless. But the point remains that such judicial
abuses are clearly administrative in character. In these instances there
is no sound reason for an absolute ban against taxpayers' suits. 5
49. Id. at 773-74, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
50. 56 Cal. App. 3d 909, 128 Cal. Rptr. 743 (1976).
51. Id. at 921, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
52. See id. See also cases cited notes 53-54 infra.
53. Caruso v. Abbott, 133 Cal. App. 2d 304, 308, 284 P.2d 113, 115 (1955)
(emphasis added).
54. Perry v. Meikle, 102 Cal. App. 2d 602, 605, 228 P.2d 17, 19 (1951) (emphasis
added), quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871).
55. Even a separation of powers argument could not ensure total judicial immunity
since taxpayers' suits have a common law basis separate and apart from any legislative
grant of statutory authority. See Gould v. People ex rel. Busch, 56 Cal. App. 3d 909,
921 n.11, 128 Cal. Rptr. 743, 750 n.11 (1976). Moreover, recent case law suggests
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The next facet of the Gould holding enunciated another reason for
barring taxpayers' suits. Ironically, since the plaintiffs had standing to
challenge the statutes in question vis-h.-vis the criminal actions then
pending against them, their case was held not to fall €"within the
declared purpose of a taxpayer's action under section 526a."'56 The
problem with that aspect of the Gould case is that it equates the "primary
purpose" rational of Blair v. Pitchess" with the expressed purpose of
taxpayers' suits. The Gould court invoked the Blair rationale to limit
the scope of taxpayers' actions despite the fact that the Blair dicta was
set forth in order to extend the scope of section 526a so that there
might exist additional "controls over public officials.""8 The liberal ap-
plication of the "standing" rule was fashioned by the Blair court to
achieve that "remedial purpose."159 Gould may conflict with the resolve
of Blair in a situation where a would-be taxpayer plaintiff combines a
taxpayer's and a nontaxpayer's cause of action and then avails himself
or herself of "standing" grounds based on the nontaxpayer's cause of
action. The problem that could arise is that the necessary showing for
relief or the scope of the relief sought might well be more confining
in the nontaxpayer's action than in the taxpayer's action. Gould seems
to imply that a plaintiff must pursue the nontaxpayer's action. But to do
so might well result in inadequate relief and in the continuation of some
illegal or wasteful governmental practice, thereby frustrating the very
purpose of taxpayers' suits. For example, an injunction may be ob-
tained in a taxpayer's action without any showing of special damage to
the particular plaintiff.60 However, injunctive relief might be impossi-
ble to achieve in a private civil action where more stringent rules of tra-
ditional equitable relief exist. To the extent that the Gould rule could
obviate the purpose of taxpayers' suits in checking governmental
abuses, its rule finds no support in the applicable laws. Simply stated,
Blair was meant to provide a sword for the taxpayer to attack govern-
ment abuses more expeditiously rather than to provide a protective
shield for the government.
Finally, it is important that the Gould court's silence concerning the
propriety of taxpayers' suits against local prosecutors and police officials
that the prohibition against suits directed to the judiciary is not an absolute one. See
Board of Supervisors v. Krumm, 62 Cal. App. 3d 935, 33 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1976) (where
the court considered the legality of a municipal judge's power to order the appointment
of additional marshal's deputies).
56. 56 Cal. App. 3d at 922, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
57. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
58. Taxpayers' Suits, supra note 4, at 904.
59. 5 Cal. 3d at 268, 486 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
60. See note 70 infra and accompanying text.
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not be interpreted to mean that this class of public officers also enjoys
immunity. California courts have never hesitated to extend the reach of
taxpayers' actions to police and prosecutorial officials,"1 particularly
when the latter embark upon a common plan or scheme of discrimina-
tory or unconstitutional enforcement of the law."2 If suits of this nature
were barred, the very bedrock of taxpayers' actions would be shattered.
I. REMDIES AVAILABLE IN TAXPAYERS' ACTIONS
In order for public interest suits to achieve their socially therapeutic
purpose, provision must be made for a broad basis of relief. Otherwise,
the perpetration of public wrongs would continue almost unhampered.
Depending upon the illegal act committed, the appropriate remedy will
require such relief as may be necessary to reimburse the public, punish
the wrongful parties, or prevent continuation of the act in question.
A taxpayer seeking to challenge the illegal expenditure of public
funds has available a wide range of remedies to ensure governmental
compliance with the relevant law. While section 526a is directed to
injunctive actions "restraining or preventing" the illegal expenditure of
public monies, California courts have sustained taxpayers' actions
where the relief sought was mandamus,63 declaratory, 4 or damages on
behalf of the public entity. 5 The interposition of common law princi-
ples in such cases may well have been responsible for producing greater
relief than that expressly provided for under section 526a.
In actions to "restrain or prevent" the illegal expenditure of public
funds, one need not identify the tax dollars illegally expended. The
California Supreme Court has specifically adopted the holding of a
lower court that "the mere 'expending [of] the time of .. . [paid
officials] in performing illegal and unauthorized acts' constituted an
unlawful use of funds which could be enjoined under section 526a."00
61. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975); Wirin v.
Parker, 48 Cal. 2d 890, 313 P.2d 844 (1957); Carl v. City of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. App.
3d 265, 132 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1976); Wirin v. Horrall, 85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 193 P.2d 470
(1948).
62. See note 61 supra. See generally Murguia v. Municipal Court, 15 Cal. 3d 286,
540 P.2d 44, 124 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1975); Comment, Development of the Defense of
Discriminatory Prosecution: Murguia v. Municipal Court, 8 Sw. U.L. REv. 687 (1976).
63. Knoff v. City & County of San Francisco, 1 Cal. App. 3d 184, 81 Cal. Rptr. 683
(1969).
64. Card v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 61 Cal. App. 3d 570, 131 Cal. Rptr.
153 (1976).
65. See, e.g., Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976);
Harman v. City & County of San Francisco, 7 Cal. 3d 150, 496 P.2d 1248, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 880 (1972); Briare v. Mathews, 202 Cal. 1, 258 P. 939 (1927); Osbum v. Stone,
170 Cal. 480, 150 P. 367 (1915).
66. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 268, 486 P.2d 1242, 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 49
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Moreover, courts have held that "[i]t is immaterial that the amount of
the illegal expenditures is small or that the illegal procedures actually
permit a saving of tax funds.1'67  The rule of these cases squares with
the essential purpose of taxpayers' suits-to prevent illegal governmen-
tal action. To focus instead on the amount of tax dollars actually
expended for such purposes would frustrate the aim of taxpayers' suits.
California courts have not conditioned the granting of permanent
injunctive relief in taxpayers' suits upon a showing of traditional
equitable requirements. 68 In Crowe v. Boyle,69 the California Supreme
(1971), quoting Wirin v. Horall, 85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 504-05, 193 P.2d 470, 474
(1948). In Blair, the court stated:
It appears from the complaint that plaintiffs seek to enjoin defendants, who admit-
tedly are county officials, from expending their own time and the time of other
county officials in executing claim and delivery process. If the claim and delivery
law is unconstitutional, then county officials may be enjoined from spending their
time carrying out its provisions even though by the collection of fees from those
invoking the provisional remedy the procedures actually effect a saving of tax funds.
5 Cal. 3d at 269, 486 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 49 (citations omitted).
67. Wirin v. Parker, 48 Cal. 2d 890, 894, 313 P.2d 844, 846 (1957); accord, Blair v.
Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 269, 486 P.2d 1242, 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 49 (1971). Some
jurisdictions, unlike California, require that the illegal or unauthorized act actually
"results] in an increase of . . . [the plaintiff's] taxes or will otherwise result in direct or
indirect pecuniary injury .... " McQUiLLiN, supra note 4, at 25.
68. The issuance of injunctive relief in California is governed by statutory language
and judicial decisions. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3422 (West 1970); CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. §
526 (West 1967).
In an action to "restrain or prevent" the illegal expenditure of public funds, the
traditional grounds for issuance of injunctive relief would be present in most, if not all,
instances. But see Citizens' Comm. for Old Age Pensions v. Board of Supervisors, 91
Cal. App. 2d 658, 205 P.2d 761 (1949) (declaratory relief inappropriate where taxpayers
had cause of action to recover illegally expended public funds). If the illegal conduct
were of the nature that an action for damages on behalf of the public treasury would be
appropriate, a multiplicity of suits would be required. See notes 80-94 infra and
accompanying text. Moreover, in many instances it would be difficult to measure the
damages accurately, thereby precluding compensatory relief. The inability to recover
damages leaves injunctive relief as the only remedy to protect public funds.
Since the focus of attention is on the nature of the governmental conduct and on the
interests of the taxpayers in general, the unclean hands doctrine, London v. Marco, 103
Cal. App. 2d 450, 229 P.2d 401 (1951), should not be applied to the individual taxpayer
plaintiff so as to bar injunctive relief. Similarly, neither the equitable public interest
test, Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39
Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964), nor the relative hardship test, Christensen v. Tucker, 114 Cal.
App. 2d 554, 250 P.2d 660 (1952), should be invoked to justify the unlawful expenditure
of public funds. See Wirin v. Parker, 48 Cal. 2d 890, 894, 313 P.2d 844, 846 (1957)
("[ilt has been expressly held in this state that expediency cannot justify the denial of
an injunction against the expenditure of public funds in violation of . . . constitutional
guarantees . . ."). However, the equitable doctrine of laches might well act as a barrier
to injunctive relief in some taxpayer actions. See Price v. Sixth Dist. Agric. Ass'n,
201 Cal. 502, 517, 258 P. 387, 393 (1927).
69. 184 Cal. 117, 193 P. 111 (1920).
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Court articulated the applicable standard:
In this state we have been very liberal in the application of the rule
permitting taxpayers to bring a suit to prevent the illegal conduct of
city officials, and no showing of special damage to the particular tax-
payer has been held ne essary.
70
The showing required for taxpayer injunctive relief is minimal in order
to further section 526a's primary purpose of "giv[ing] a large body of
citizens standing to challenge governmental actions."', Observing that
"[Uit is elementary that public officials must themselves obey the law,"7 2
the California Supreme Court has declared that section 526a
"provide[s] a general citizen remedy for controlling illegal governmen-
tal activity.
73
To date no California court has specifically articulated the showing
necessary for a preliminary injunction to issue in a taxpayer's action.
The traditional test for preliminary injunctive relief generally, i.e., the
balancing of the equities of the parties, 4 has been set forth in numerous
70. Id. at 152, 193 P. at 125.
71. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 269, 486 P.2d 1242, 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 50
(1971).
72. Wirin v. Parker, 48 Cal. 2d 890, 894, 313 P.2d 844, 846 (1957). One of the
classic statements of this proposition can be found in the majority opinion of Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), wherein the Court stated: "Nothing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard
of the charter of its own existence." Id. at 659. See Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
73. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 763, 533 P.2d 222, 226, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 98
(1975).
74. On the balancing test, the court has said:
"The granting or denial of a preliminary injunction does not amount to an adjudi-
cation of the ultimate rights in controversy. It merely determines that the court,
balancing the respective equities of the parties, concludes that, pending a trial on
the merits, the defendant should or that he should not be restrained from exercising
the right claimed by him." . . . The general purpose of such an injunction is the
preservation of the status quo until a final determination of the merits of the
action .... Thus, the court examines all of the material before it in order to
consider "whether or not a greater injury will result to the defendant from granting
the injunction than to the plaintiff from refusing it; . . ." . . . In making that
determination the court will consider the probability of the plaintiff's ultimately
prevailing in the case and, it has been said, will deny a preliminary injunction un-
less there is a reasonable probability that plaintiff will be successful in the assertion
of his rights. . . . "In the last analysis the trial court must determine which party
is the more likely to be injured by the exercise of its discretion ... and it must be
exercised in favor of that party . . ."
Continental Baking Co. v. Katz, 68 Cal. 2d 512, 528, 439 P.2d 889, 899, 67 Cal. Rptr.
761, 771 (1968) (citations omitted).
75. See Socialist Workers 1974 Cal. Campaign Comm. v. Brown, 53 Cal. App. 3d 879,
125 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1975); California State Univ. v. NCAA, 47 Cal. App. 3d 533, 121
Cal. Rptr. 85 (1975); Transcentury Properties, Inc. v. State, 41 Cal. App. 3d 835, 116
Cal. Rptr. 487 (1974).
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cases.7 5 However, application of this test in the context of taxpayers'
suits is clearly inappropriate. There is a danger that preliminary injunc-
tive relief might be precluded were the court to "balance the equities" of
the parties. Given the representative character of the taxpayer's action76
and the fact that "no showing of special damage to the particular tax-
payer" need be established for permanent injunctive relief,77 balancing of
equities should not be done in taxpayers' suits. The policies underlying
taxpayers' actions dictate that the plaintiffs probability of success on
the merits should be the only showing necessary for issuance of a pre-
liminary injunction. Injury to the public can necessarily be presumed
both from the illegal expenditure of public funds78 and from the very
existence of illegal governmental conduct.
79
In addition to actions to "restrain or prevent" the illegal expenditure
of public funds, California decisional law has clearly established the
right of a taxpayer to commence an action on behalf of the public
treasury to recover funds previously expended illegally. Like the tax-
payer's injunctive action, the taxpayer's damages action furthers the
sound policies underlying the concept of the taxpayer's action by pro-
viding a remedy for illegal governmental conduct already completed.
Such actions discourage illegal government conduct since they serve to
inform public officials that they may be personally liable for public
funds illegally expended.
The justification for the taxpayer's damages action was extensively
explored in the early case of Osburn v. Stone. 0 The Osburn court,
while recognizing that section 526a does not specifically authorize
such an action, noted that the statutory language "does not in letter or in
spirit forbid a taxpayer from seeking to recover on behalf of his munici-
pality the same moneys if illegally expended." '81 The court, in uphold-
ing this type of suit, analogized to the shareholder's derivative action:
76. See note 2 supra.
77. Crowe v. Boyle, 184 Cal. 117, 152, 193 P. 111, 125 (1920).
78. See Mines v. Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 280, 257 P. 530, 534 (1927), disapproved
on other grounds, Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 223, 551 P.2d 1, 15, 130 Cal. Rptr.
697, 711 (1976).
79. This latter proposition is especially true in situations where the governmental
conduct sought to be enjoined infringes upon constitutionally protected rights. For
example, in Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. City of Thousand Oaks, 5 Cal. 3d 817, 489 P.2d
809, 97 Cal. Rptr. 777, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1042 (1971), the California Supreme
Court, in invalidating an "anti-littering" ordinance on first amendment grounds, com-
mented: "The very presence of the ordinance on the books endangers the free distribu-
tion of ideas." Id. at 828, 489 P.2d at 816, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
80. 170 Cal. 480, 150 P. 367 (1915).
81. Id. at 482, 150 P. at 368.
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[T]he necessity to a municipality, whose affairs are in the hands of
hostile trustees or councilmen, to recover for illegal expenditures, through
the medium of such an action, is quite as great and as imperative as it
is in the case of private corporations, and as a stockholder of the
latter would -have on behalf of his corporation, upon the refusal of its
directors to act, the right to maintain such an action, so we think
should a taxpayer in the case of a municipality be accorded the same
right and power.8 2
In spite of the comparison to the shareholder's derivative action, the
exact contours of the taxpayer's damages action are not well defined.
Some general requirements, however, have been repeatedly stated as
preconditions to bringing suit. Prior to commencement of the action,
demand must first be made upon the governing body or other appropri-
ate official s to institute the action."4 As in a shareholder's derivative
action,s8 the demand requirement has been dispensed with in a taxpay-
er's suit where it would be of no avail.1s Upon subsequent failure to
commence suit, the governing body or other appropriate official should
be named as a party defendant along with the person who illegally
expended the funds.
8 7
82. Id. at 482-83, 150 P. at 368.
83. In some situations, especially at the state level, the official who illegally expended
public funds may not be responsible to a governing board. In such a situation, demand
should be made on the public official's superior, the governor, or the attorney general.
84. Cf. Briare v. Mathews, 202 Cal. 1, 8, 258 P. 939, 942 (1927); Osburn v. Stone,
170 Cal. 480, 483, 150 P. 367, 368 (1915); Mock v. City of Santa Rosa, 126 Cal. 330,
342, 58 P. 826, 829 (1899); Newberry v. Evans, 97 Cal. App. 120, 125, 275 P. 465, 468
(1928). This is the same requirement necessary to commence a shareholder's derivative
action in California. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 834(a) (2) (West Supp. 1976). See
Starbird v. Lane, 203 Cal. App. 2d 247, 21 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1962); Fairchild v. Bank of
America, 192 Cal. App. 2d 252, 13 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1961).
85. See, e.g., Reed v. Norman, 152 Cal. App. 2d 892, 314 P.2d 204 (1957); Gottesfeld
v. Richmaid Ice Cream Co., 115 Cal. App. 2d 854, 252 P.2d 973 (1953); Pourroy v.
Gardner, 122 Cal. App. 521, 10 P.2d 815 (1932).
86. See, e.g., Briare v. Mathews, 202 Cal. 1, 8, 258 P. 939, 942 (1927); Moch v. City
of Santa Rosa, 126 Cal. 330, 342, 58 P. 826, 829 (1899); Newberry v. Evans, 97 Cal.
App. 120, 125, 275 P. 465, 468 (1928).
87. Osburn v. Stone, 170 Cal. 480, 482-83, 150 P. 367, 368 (1915); Silver v. Watson,
26 Cal. App. 3d 905, 909, 103 Cal. Rptr. 576, 579 (1972). It should be noted that the
California Supreme Court, in Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1976), upheld, without commenting on the prior demand requirement, a
taxpayer's action for recovery of illegally expended tax funds where the facts indicated
that the only person joined as defendant was the official who allegedly expended the
funds. While Stanson calls into question the necessity for demand and joinder, the
prudent course is to follow the cases which have specifically passed upon these issues.
In addition to ensuring a properly stated cause of action, these requirements serve
important functions. The demand requirement, by alerting the government to the illegal
expenditures by public officials, may obviate the need for taxpayer action by spurring
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Whether or not the taxpayer has an absolute right to bring the action
upon failure of the government to act has been an issue causing much
concern. In matters of corporate law, a shareholder may not bring a
derivative action when the board of directors, acting reasonably and in
good faith, exercises its business judgment and refuses to bring the
action because of its belief that it is not in the best interests of the
corporation."' This principle has been applied in the taxpayer context.
In Silver v. Watson, 9 the court stated:
A taxpayer may not bring an action on behalf of a public agency
unless the governing body has a duty to act, and has refused to do so.
If the governing body has discretion in the matter, the taxpayer may not
interfere. 9 0
The Silver decision, although logically extending the Osburn court's
shareholder's derivative action analogy, is unsound in the context of the
taxpayer's action. If the government has refused to act because the
costs of pursuing such an action outweigh any possible monetary bene-
fits to be derived from the action, what possible justification exists to
prevent the public-minded citizen from recovering for the public treas-
ury public funds illegally expended? Rather than interfering with the
proper functioning of government, such actions promote the goal of
controlling illegal governmental conduct.
Some question is cast on the Silver rationale by the California Su-
preme Court's recent pronouncements in Stanson v. Mott.91 The court
upheld the right of a taxpayer to maintain an action on behalf of the
governmental action to recover illegally expended funds. The joinder requirement
facilitates governmental participation in the action.
88. Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 174, 240 P.2d 421, 426 (1952);
Fornaseri v. Cosmosart Realty & Bldg. Corp., 96 Cal. App. 549, 557, 274 P. 597, 600
(1929).
89. 26 Cal. App. 3d 905, 103 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1972).
90. Id. at 909, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 579. See Elliott v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 2d
894, 897, 5 Cal. Rptr. 116, 118 (1960).
It has often been stated that "[a] taxpayer may sue a governmental body in a
representative capacity in cases involving fraud, collusion, ultra vires, or failure on the
part of the governmental body to perform a duty specifically enjoined." Gogerty v.
Coachella Valley Junior College Dist., 57 Cal. 2d 727, 730, 371 P.2d 582, 584, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 806, 808 (1962). See also Silver v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 39, 40-41, 366
P.2d 651, 652, 17 Cal. Rptr. 379, 380 (1961). According to the California Supreme
Court,
[tlhis well-established rule ensures that the California courts, by entertaining only
those taxpayers' suits that seek to measure governmental performance against a
legal standard, do not trespass into the domain of legislative or executive discretion.
Harman v. City & County of San Francisco, 7 Cal. 3d 150, 160-61, 496 P.2d 1248, 1255,
101 Cal. Rptr. 880, 887 (1972).
91. 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976). See note 87 supra.
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public treasury to recover tax funds illegally expended. Of particular
interest here is the fact that the court's opinion does not indicate that the
taxpayer made demand on any governmental body or official to com-
mence the action or that such demand was refused. Whether or not this
fact will take on judicial significance remains to be seen.
While Stanson leaves unclear the circumstances under which a tax-
payer may commence suit, the court clearly articulated the test to be
used to ascertain whether or not a public official is personally liable for
illegally expended funds. Prior to the Stanson decision, strict liability
was imposed on the official who erroneously expended public funds. 2
This position was based "in large part on the assumption that the limits
of authorized public expenditures are always clearly ascertainable and
thus that there could be no excuse for a public official innocently to ex-
ceed such boundaries." 93 The Stanson court rejected this assumption
and held that a public official is "subject to personal liability for im-
proper expenditures made in the absence of . . .due care."0' 4 That
standard, while ensuring sufficient latitude for the proper exercise of
governmental powers, encourages public officials to confine their activi-
ties to the scope of their authority lest they be personally liable to the
public for funds illegally expended.
IV. ATTORNEYS' FEES
The prohibitive cost of litigating taxpayers' suits95 poses an awesome
obstacle to any potential plaintiff contemplating a public interest law-
92. See Mines v. Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 257 P. 530 (1927).
93. 17 Cal. 3d at 223, 551 P.2d at 13, 130 Cal. at 709.
94. Id. at 227, 551 P.2d at 15, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 711 (footnote omitted). The court
indicated that
[n]umerous considerations may be relevant to the determination of whether a public
official has acted with due care or not. For example, a court may consider whether
the expenditure's impropriety was obvious or not, whether the official was alerted
to the possible invalidity of the expenditure, or whether the official relied upon legal
advice or on the presumed validity of an existing legislative enactment or judicial
decision in making the expenditure.
Id. at 227, 551 P.2d at 15-16, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 711-12 (citations omitted). The court
did not comment on the appropriate test in the situation "in which a public official, or
his family or friends, has personally benefitted from an unauthorized expenditure of
public funds . . . ." Id. at 227 n.12, 551 P.2d at 15 n.13, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 711 n.13
(footnotes misnumbered in unofficial reporters).
95. See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 & n.10 (N.D. Cal. 1972), afl'd,
488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974); King & Plater, The
Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environmental Litigation, 41 TENN. L. Rav. 27,
29-31 (1973) [hereinafter cited as King & Plater]; Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 305-11;
Witt, After Alyeska: Can the Contender Survive?, Jums DocTOR, Oct., 1975, at 34
[hereinafter cited as Witt]; Note, A Setback for Environmental and Other Public
[Vol. 10
TAXPAYERS' ACTIONS IN CALIFORNIA
suit."6 This problem is particularly acute where the complexity of the
legal and factual issues consumes much time and experienced effort and
where the relief sought is injunctive rather than remunerative. 97  The
staggering costs incident to litigating these kinds of taxpayers' suits have
the effect of deterring many a responsible representative of the public
from commencing legal actions, the benefits of which accrue primarily
to the public's interest. Ironically, this is often the case despite the fact
that the more modem trend has been to encourage such representatives
"to sue, particularly where governmental entities are involved as defend-
ants [since] only private citizens can be expected to 'guard the
guardians.' "Is To the extent that the public interest litigant is absolute-
ly barred from any remuneration for the reasonable counsel fees ex-
pended, those litigants will be deprived of the opportunity to provide a
needed public service which quite often only they can furnish. °9
Accordingly, the viability of taxpayers' actions to check governmental
abuses will be undermined proportionately.
Generally speaking, the traditional American rule0 0 has been that
Interest Plaintiffs, 55 NEB. L. REv. 283, 292-93 (1976) [hereinafter cited as A Setback].
96. For a general discussion of attorneys' fees in private interest litigation, see
Nussbaum, supra note 1; Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney
General": Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HASTnGS
L.J. 733 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Private Attorney General]; Note, A Giant Step
Backwards: Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society and Its Effect on Public
Interest Litigation, 35 MD. L. Rev. 675, 692-96 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Alyeska and
Public Interest Litigation]; Note, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After Mills. v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 316 (1971); Comment, Court Awarded
Attorney's Fees And Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. Rev. 636 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Attorney's Fees].
97. As Judge Peckham observed in La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D.
Cal. 1972), affd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974):
In many "public interest" cases only injunctive relief is sought, and the average
attorney or litigant must hesitate, if not shudder, at the thought of "taking on" an
entity such as the California Department of Highways, with no prospect of finan-
cial compensation for the efforts and expenses rendered.
Id. at 101. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968);
King & Plater, supra note 95, at 29; Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 303; Alyeska & Public
Interest Litigation, supra note 96, at 693; Hearings on the Effect of Legal Fees on the
Adequacy of Representation Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 787 (1973).
98. 57 F.R.D. at 100-01.
99. See id.; Alyeska and Public Interest Litigation, supra note 96, at 694.
100. For an historical discussion, analysis, and application of the rule, see Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 270-71 (1975); F.D. Rich Co. v.
United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 126-31 (1974); Flanders v.
Tweed, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 450 (1872); Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211
(1872); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 306 (1796); Falcon, Award of
Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights and Constitutional Litigation, 33 M. L. REv. 379
(1973); King & Plater, supra note 95, at 31-37; Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 311-14;
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"attorneys' fees are not ordinarily recoverable without statutory or con-
tractual authorization."' 0'1  The no-fee rule, however, has been sharply
criticized for more than a half century. 10 2 Notwithstanding the Ameri-
can rule, courts are empowered to award attorneys' fees under the
auspices of their equitable powers. 03 Exercising such equitable pow-
ers, both federal and state courts have fashioned several exceptions' 0 4 to
the traditional rule.
Under the obdurate behavior exception, the "courts use their equita-
ble powers to impose [attorneys'] costs on defendants who behaved in
bad faith."'' 05 While this exception operates primarily against those
who abuse the legal process, some courts have invoked the obdurate
behavior doctrine in a more "outward-looking" manner and in so doing
have shifted the focus "away from the culpability of the party litigants
qua litigants to consider also the relevance of defendants' extrajudicial
conduct in the extended public interest context.' 0 6 To a certain extent,
this exception can be of value to the successful taxpayer litigant attempt-
ing to recoup reasonable attorneys' fees.
Another general exception applies in the "common fund" situation.
"Here the courts use their equitable powers to insure that the benefi-
Comment, After Alyeska: Will Public Interest Litigation Survive?, 16 SANTA CLARA
LAw. 267, 268-71 (1976) [hereinafter cited as After Alyeska]; Attorney's Fees,
supra note 96.
101. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).
For the California adoption of this rule, see section 1021 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure, quoted note 129 infra. A recently enacted statutory exception to this rule
now allows the "prevailing plaintiff' in certain civil rights actions to recover attorneys'
fees. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (Supp. IV, 1976).
102. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 270 & n.45
(1975); Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J 849 (1929); First Report of the Judicial Council
of Massachusetts, 11 MAss. L.Q. 7 (1925).
103. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939). See Hall v. Cole, 412
U.S. 1, 4-9 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392-93 (1970);
Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530 (1962); Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S.
Ry., 28 F.2d 233, 240-46 (8th Cir. 1928), rev'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1930).
104. Consider those listed in King & Plater, supra note 95, at 39; After Alyeska, supra
note 100, at 272-77.
105. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 96 (N.D. Cal. 1972), afl'd, 488 F.2d
559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974). See F.D. Rich Co. v. United
States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S.
527 (1962); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974); City Bank v. Rivera
Davila, 438 F.2d 1367 (1st Cir. 1971); 6 J. Moons, FEDaRL PRAcTIcE 54.77(2)
(1976); Note, Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 COLUM.
L. REv. 78 (1953).
106. King & Plater, supra note 95, at 42. See Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494, 500
(4th Cir. 1963) (en banc); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th
Cir. 1951); cases cited in King & Plater, supra note 95, at 43 nn.82 & 83.
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ciaries of litigation are the ones who share the expense."107  In much
the same way as the obdurate behavior exception has been expanded,
the common fund exception has been significantly broadened to permit
a plaintiff's recovery of attorneys' fees where a "substantial benefit" is
passed on to an advantaged class even though the suit could never
"produce a monetary recovery from which the fees could be paid."
10 8
Similarly, where an action for injunctive relief renders a "substantial
service" to a benefited class by protecting the latter's constitutional
rights, the successful litigant will be entitled to an award of attorneys'
fees. 109 "[N]othing in these cases indicates that the suit must actually
bring money into the court as a prerequisite to the court's power to order
reimbursement of expenses" 110 under the substantial benefit rule.
These exceptions have been held to apply with equal force even
where there exists no statutory provision for fee-shifting.111 The gener-
al tenor of these doctrines strongly indicates that the prevailing plaintiff
litigant should recoup attorneys' fees in all those "situations in which
overriding considerations indicate the need for such recovery." 1 2 Here
again, the common benefit doctrine can be of great value to the public
interest litigant if a court decides to apply the doctrine broadly.
The more recent trend is toward a "private attorney general" excep-
tion which permits courts to "use their power offensively when necessary
and appropriate to insure the effectuation of . . . [important public
policies]."11 3 The private attorney general exception has in principle
107. 57 F.R.D. at 96. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167
(1939); Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Petturs, 113 U.S. 116, 127 (1885); Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532 (1881); King & Plater, supra note 95, at 43-47; Nuss-
baum, supra note 1, at 314-15; Alyeska and Public Interest Litigation, supra note 96,
at 683-86.
108. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970). See King & Plater,
supra note 95, 46-47; Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 315-16; Comment, Attorney's Fees
Under the Landrum-Griffin Act: The Need for "Union Therapeutics," 7 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 137, 151-53 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Union Therapeutics]; Alyeska and Public
Interest Litigation, supra note 96, at 685.
109. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 8 (1973). See King & Plater, supra note 95, at 47;
Alyeska and Public Interest Litigation, supra note 96, at 685-86. A good discussion of
the Hall case can be found in Union Therapeutics, supra note 108, at 153-59.
110. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970).
111. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375 (1970). See also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240,
275-78 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970) (footnote omitted);
accord, Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 798-19 (1967).
113. 57 F.R.D. at 96, 101. See Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 604-06 (5th
Cir. 1974); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143: (5th Cir. 1971);
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blossomed from the obdurate behavior and common benefit excep-
tions.114 While some distinctions can be made between the private
attorney general exception and other exceptions, one commentator has
persuasively concluded:
[lit is difficult to identify any principle that would distinguish, as a
matter of equitable power, the private attorney general rationale from
the common benefit and bad faith theories. 115
The similarity between the operative logic of the common benefit excep-
tion and the private attorney general exception renders it almost impos-
sible to discern a viable difference between the underlying rationales of
the two theories:
Although common benefit fee awards developed as a means of pre-
venting unjust enrichment, the Court's most recent common benefit
cases . . . blurred the distinction between the benefit theory and the
private attorney general rationale by finding a common benefit in mere
vindication of congressional policy." 
6
Likewise, with the obdurate behavior exception cases it has been pointed
out:
[1]n terms of judicial power, there appears to be no clear distinction
between a bad faith award based on violation of a clear and estab-
lished right, and a private attorney general award based on violation
of an important right."
7
Yet, despite these important similarities and the expansion of the
obdurate behavior and common benefit doctrines to include a more
Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219, 1224-25 (C.D.
Cal. 1973); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 693-95 (M.D. Ala. 1972), alf'd, 409
U.S. 942 (1972); Attorney's Fees, supra note 96, at 655-81. But see Bradley v. School
Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 327-31 (4th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
A general discussion of many of the federal cases is presented in King & Plater, supra
note 95, at 50-56; Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 321-31; Private Attorney General, supra
note 96, at 748-55.
In some jurisdictions, however, successful taxpayer litigants have been permitted to
secure counsel fee costs for quite some time. See Pensioners Protective Ass'n v. Davis,
150 P.2d 974 (Colo. 1944); Kimble v. Board of Comm'rs, 66 N.E. 1023 (Ind. App.
1903); Frost v. Inhabitants of Belmont, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 152 (1863); Allen v. City
of Omaha, 286 N.W. 916 (Neb. 1939); Homer v. Chamber of Commerce, 72 S.E.2d 21
(N.C. 1952); State ex rel. Bonner v. Andrews, 175 S.W. 563 (Tenn. 1915).
114. See King & Plater, supra note 95, at 43; Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 318; After
Alyeska, supra note 100, at 276; The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REV. 170,
175-76 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Term]. More importantly, in Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), the Court invoked the significant
benefit rationale in a private attorney general context. Id. at 402.
115. 1974 Term, supra note 114, at 175-76.
116. Id. at 176 (footnotes omitted).
117. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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outward-reaching private attorney general exception,"s and despite the
"therapeutic" nature of the substantial benefit cases,1 19 the United
States Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilder-
ness Society'20 refused to acknowledge a private attorney general ex-
ception to the traditional American rule.' 21 While declining to assess
the "merits or demerits" of the American rule,2 2 the Court posited sev-
eral statutory, 2 3 equitable,124 and policy arguments 2 5 to support its
holding. Notwithstanding those arguments, the Alyeska decision has
come under heavy fire from both a well reasoned dissent126 and nearly
every commentator who. has reviewed the case. 12  However, in light of
118. See note 114 supra.
119. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970).
120. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
121. Id. at 271 & n.45.
122. Id. at 270.
123. Id. at 251-57.
124. Id. at 245-50, 259-70 & nn.44 & 46.
125. Id. at 264 & n.39, 265, 269.
126. Id. at 272 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Statutory analysis: The majority opinion urged that an 1853 court-costs statute and its
subsequent amendments deprived the Court of any jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees in
private attorney general suits. Id. at 247-69. However, the Court never articulated any
reason for applying these statutes to private attorney cases while not applying the
statutes in obdurate behavior and common benefit cases. See 1974 Term, supra note
114, at 175 n.38. Moreover, the dissent in Alyeska correctly refers to several of the
Court's prior holdings which plainly established that the various court-cost statutes pose
no bar to the general equitable power of courts to award counsel fees. 421 U.S. at
278-81, citing Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1882); Fleischmann Dis-
tilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 & n.11 (1967). See Sprague
v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164, 166 (1939). In short, the majority's conten-
tion in Alyeska "will not withstand even the most casual reading of the precedents."
421 U.S. at 282.
Equity jurisdiction: The Alyeska opinion can be understood to say that counsel fees
have traditionally been a matter of statutory allowance or construction. Id. at 251-57,
260-63. Yet as Justice Marshall's dissent clearly demonstrates, the Court has always
enjoyed an independent equitable power to award counsel fees. Id. at 274-75, citing
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164, 166 (1939). See Hall v. Cole, 412
U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970). These
cases and others, see 421 U.S. at 275-77, "plainly establish an independent basis for
equity courts to grant attorneys' fees under the several rather generous rubrics." Id.
at 277.
Manageability and policy considerations: Justice Marshall aptly noted that formula-
tion of practical guidelines in the private attorney general context need not prove any
more difficult than in other areas where the Court has fashioned similar relief. Id. at
282-84. Even assuming arguendo any shortcomings in his three prong test, id. at 285,
the fact remains that guidelines of a similar nature could be formulated in order to se-
cure a reasonable attorney cost recovery for the public interest litigant. See, e.g.,
1974 Term, supra note 114, at 180-82; A Setback, supra note 95, at 294-98.
127. See Witt supra note 95; 1974 Term, supra note 114; Comment, Alyeska Pipeline
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the Alyeska holding, a taxpayer litigant can only recover counsel costs
in those limited instances where a court would be willing to expand the
obdurate behavior or common benefit exceptions.
Whatever the impact of Alyeska on the federal judiciary, California
courts have never hesitated to exercise their own independent judg-
ment as to whether or not restrictive holdings of the federal courts
should be followed.' 28  And even though California has adopted the
American rule by statutory provision,129 state courts have exercised
their equitable powers to permit fee-shifting. Furthermore, the accept-
ed practice has long been to construe liberally those public interest
statutes which provide for attorneys' fees.18 0  To award counsel costs in
taxpayers' suits seems consistent with the state policy of encouraging
public interest litigation.' 31
Following the pre-Alyeska position of the United States Supreme
Court, 32 California courts have granted counsel fees to a successful
plaintiff litigant who renders a "substantial benefit" to a particular class
even in the absence of a monetary award or common fund. 83 In
D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners,'34 the state supreme court
declined an opportunity to rule on the applicability of the obdurate
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society: Demise of the "Private Attorney General," 6 ENVul. L.
243 (1975); After Alyeksa, supra note 100; Alyeska and Public Interest Litigation, supra
note 96; A Setback, supra note 95; 1975 BRIGHAM YOUNG U.L. REv. 777; 42 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 351 (1975); 44 U. CINN. L. Ruv. 873 (1975); 51 WASH. L. Rv. 1047 (1976).
128. See, e.g., authorities cited in Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled
Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 STN. L. REv. 297 (1977).
129. Section 1021 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides:
Except as attorney's fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure
and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agree-
ment, express or implied, of the parties; but parties to actions or proceedings are
entitled to costs and disbursements, as hereinafter provided.
CAL. CODE Cry. PRO. § 1021 (West 1967).
130. See, e.g., Morgan v. Reasor Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 881, 896-97, 447 P.2d 638, 648-49,
73 Cal. Rptr. 398, 408-09 (1968); Silberman v. Swoap, 50 Cal. App. 3d 568, 570, 123
Cal. Rptr. 456, 458 (1975); accord, Trout v. Carleson, 37 Cal. App. 3d 337, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 282 (1974).
131. See People v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 283, 507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192
(1973); Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104
Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972); Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 796 (1971).
132. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l
Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
133. Mandel v. Hodges, 54 Cal. App. 3d 596, 620-23, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244, 260-62
(1976); Fletcher v. A.J. Indus., Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 323-25, 72 Cal. Rptr. 146,
152-53 (1968). Since the substantial benefit exception is but an extension of the
common fund doctrine, the latter has a fortiori been accepted by the California courts.
See authorities cited id. at 323, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
134. 11 Cal. 3d 1, 520 P.2d 10, 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1974).
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behavior and private attorney general exceptions in California.' 85 Nev-
ertheless, two substantial benefit cases have gone a long way in at least
adopting the rationale of the private attorney general exception. Knoff
v. City & County of San Francisco36 provides a good illustration. The
case involved a taxpayers' suit seeking a writ of mandate to correct
certain property tax assessment policies.' The broad outward-reaching
effect of the relief sought, the absence of any actual monetary fund,
and the public nature of the benefit conferred, all render the case practi-
cally indistinguishable from a private attorney general suit. Notwith-
standing these factors, the Knot! court, without addressing the latter
exception, found that enough significant benefit was received by tax-
payers generally to permit the court to exercise its plenary equitable
powers.1
38
The case of Mandel v. Hodges' 9 is perhaps even more difficult to
limit to the substantial benefit doctrine. Mandel was an action to enjoin
the governor from ordering the closure of state offices on Good Friday
between the hours of noon and 3:00 p.m. 40 The substantial benefit
rendered by the plaintiff was, in the words of the court, "to the citizens
and taxpayers of th[e] state."'' The public policy effectuated was
the preservation of public funds in compliance with the establishment
clause of the first amendment and the California Constitution. 42  Con-
sequently, the Mandel court's reservation about applying the private
attorney general exception14 proves to be conceptually inconsistent with
its liberal application of the substantial benefit doctrine 44 in view of the
fact that all of the elements of a private attorney general exception were
present in Mandel. First, the "important right being protected" was
one actually "shared by the general public" and effectuated a strong
135. Id. at 26-27, 520 P.2d at 28-29, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 804-05; accord, Bozung
v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 13 Cal. 3d 483, 485, 531 P.2d 783, 784,
119 Cal. Rptr. 215, 216 (1975); Douglas v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 50 Cal. App.
3d 449, 468-69, 123 Cal. Rptr. 683, 695 (1975). Resolution of these issues is currently
pending before the California Supreme Court in the case of Serrano v. Priest, No.
30398 (Cal. 1975). Although the court decided the substantive issues in the Serrano
case on December 30, 1976, the court has postponed decision on the question of attor-
neys' fees.
136. 1 Cal. App. 3d 184, 81 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1969).
137. Id. at 190-93, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 686-88.
138. Id. at 203-04, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 695-96.
139. 54 Cal. App. 3d 596, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1976).
140. Id. at 601-02, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
141. Id. at 623, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 261 (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 619, 623, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 259, 261.
143. Id. at 620, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 259-60.
144. Id. at 621-23, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 260-62.
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public policy. Second, the absence of the plaintiff's pecuniary interest
in the outcome along with the financial burden of private enforcement
were "such as to make the award essential." Third, the shifting of the
costs in Mandel effectively placed the burden on the class that actually
benefited from the litigation.' 45 Finally, the class of beneficiaries
in Mandel was not "small in number and easily identifiable;" the
general benefits received were not capable of being "traced with some
accuracy;" and the costs of the case were not capable of being "shifted
with some exactitude to those benefiting."' 46 By the court's own admis-
sion,147 "the purported benefits accrue[d] to the general public.' 48 The
Mandel decision thereby blurred whatever distinction might have existed
between the common benefit and private attorney general cases. 149
Although the California authorities in this area are not well devel-
oped, extended applications of the common benefit and obdurate be-
havior doctrines do provide some measure of hope for the recovery of
counsel costs by public interest litigants. However, it must be conceded
that such applications are generous ones. When the taxpayer litigant
files a bona fide suit, he or she has no real assurance that the public at
large will repay the litigant, by awarding reasonable attorneys' fees, for
the benefit the public has received. 150 That is the reason that the re-
coupment of such fees must be grounded in a broad private attorney
general exception. The costs of many of these lawsuits are simply too
great for many a litigant to bear even if it means that an important lib-
erty or right may have to be forfeited. "Therefore, if public interest liti-
gation is to survive, except perhaps as an avocation of the wealthy, it
must be subsidized."'' For the present purposes such subsidization
145. These tests are adopted from Justice Marshall's dissent in Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 284-85 (1975), and Judge Peckham's majority
opinion in La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 488
F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974). See A Setback, supra
note 95, at 29 6-98.
146. The references quoted in the text were offered by the Alyeska court as several of
the characteristic elements of the common benefit cases as distinguished from the private
attorney general class of decisions. 421 U.S. at 264-65 n.39.
147. See text accompanying note 141 supra.
148. 421 U.S at 265 n.39.
149. See text accompanying note 115 supra. An equally broad extension of the
common benefit theory was invoked by the court in Weiss v. Bruno, 523 P.2d 915, 916-
17 (Wash. 1974). See Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Kottsick, 545 P.2d 1, 4 (Wash. 1976).
150. In this respect, one commentator has cogently noted:
It is particularly unreasonable to deny fees to a plaintiff who is, in effect, en-
forcing government policy by bringing a lawsuit to require compliance with a
statute or the Constitution. Without some provision for fee-shifting in such cases,
the law frequently confers a paper right only.
After Alyeska, supra note 100, at 289 (footnote omitted). See id. at 289-90 n.143.
151. Id. at 288.
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can be made possible by awarding attorneys' fees to the successful pub-
lic interest litigant. In the absence of statutory provision, determination
of the propriety of granting an award of counsel fees along with the
establishment of guidelines for establishing the reasonableness of such
fees can be equitably conducted by a trial court.1 " ' Given the present
state of the law, any refusal to reimburse the taxpayer litigant for the
reasonable costs expended would result in an injustice to the successful
plaintiff and, ultimately, to the general public as well.
V. CONCLUSION
The taxpayer litigant is in many ways the contemporary counterpart
of the Socratic gadfly. In a very real sense, the success or failure of
modern democratic government depends in part on the existence of such
public-minded citizens. As public guardians they help ensure that the
rule of law will be preserved. However much our laws encourage their
efforts, the task of safe-keeping the general welfare will always be a
formidable one. "The idle and whimsical plaintiff, a dilettante who
litigates for a lark, is a spectre which haunts the legal literature, not the
courtroom."'1 8 The time, effort, and potential expense of public inter-
est litigation all render it particularly unappealing to the fanciful
dabbler in social causes. On the other hand, legal barriers in areas such
as standing, remedial relief, and attorneys' fees may create a wall too
high for even the public-minded to scale. As this article has attempted
to demonstrate, the laws in California are conducive to furthering the
ends of public interest litigation. Accordingly, our state laws should
continue to encourage social input from the public interest litigant so
that once litigated the best interests of the public may prevail.
152. See id. at 290; 1974 Term, supra note 114, at 177-82; A Setback, supra
note 95, at 292-98.
153. Scott, Standing In the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARv. L. Ry.
645, 674 (1973).
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